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Large dams are making a comeback. However, large dams reflect an 
outdated development paradigm narrowly focused on economic growth 
through modernization. This article employs a post-development lens to 
highlight three biases of the narrow development perspective that underlies 
large dams. First, it views rivers, and nature more generally, as an unrealized 
source of economic growth and an input to production. Second, it is blind to 
distributional impacts and is resultantly inequitable: The benefits of large dams 
are concentrated in the hands of the wealthy, while conditions for the poor 
worsen or do not improve. Third, it disempowers its supposed beneficiaries by 
de-politicizing the development decisions to pursue large dam projects. Each 
of these biases is illustrated in reference to the Mekong River Basin’s 
experience with large dam development. It is alarming, therefore, that large 
dams seem to be making a resurgence in Asia, Africa and South America, and 
are once again receiving World Bank support. This article serves as a reminder 
of why large dams do not deliver equitable development and why they thus 
faded from the development agenda at the turn of the century. 
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1. Introduction: Here We Go Again 
 
Large dams are making a comeback.1 The first in a cascade of large dams 
planned for the main stream of the Mekong River—a project that was conceived 
in the 1960s—is currently under construction (International Rivers, 2013). The 
Brazilian government recently revealed its intention to pursue an aggressive 
hydropower agenda in the Amazon River Basin (Fearnside, 2012). And more 
large dams are planned for the Congo and Zambezi Rivers—three of which are 
listed by the World Bank as “regional transformational projects” in its recent 
strategy paper, which signals the Bank’s objective of pursuing large infrastructure 
projects to “catalyze very large-scale benefits” (World Bank, 2013, p. 8, p. 1). 
This article serves as a reminder of why large dams do not deliver 
equitable development. It draws on post-development theory to critique large 
dam projects and the outdated development agenda they reflect. The arguments 
presented are illustrated in reference to the Mekong River Basin’s experience with 
large dam development.  
 
2. Dams and Development 
 
By the time the World Commission on Dams presented its scathing 
critique of large dams in 2000 (WCD, 2000a), it was clear that the heyday of large 
dams had passed (McCully, 2001). The loss of faith in large dam projects 
followed increasing empirical evidence of the all-too-often environmentally 
destructive and socially inequitable impact of large dams (Hirsch & Wilson, 
2011). Strong political opposition in countries that had witnessed the negative 
consequences of large dams made future projects unviable. This was the case in 
Thailand, for example, following the controversy surrounding the Pak Mun dam 
(Middleton, Garcia, & Foran 2009; Hirsch & Wilson, 2011). Following the release 
of the World Commission on Dams’ report, McCully (2001, xvi) observed that 
“the rate of new dam construction is dropping fast in every region of the world.” 
This trend, McCully (2001, xvi) noted, was accompanied by fast-declining public 
appetite for dams in many parts of the world, with a shaking of “the old belief in 
dams as shining icons of prosperity and modernity.” 
 
Prior to the shift away from large dams in the late 1990s, there existed an 
“entrenched belief that large-scale water development schemes are an essential 
part of the process of economic development – a process which we have been 
taught to see as the only means of combating poverty and malnutrition, and of 
assuring health, longevity and prosperity for all.” (Goldmsith & Hildyard, 1984, 
p. 276) This meshed well with the contemporary view of development as a 
process of economic growth through modernization—a paradigm referred to 
throughout this article as “classical development.”  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 According to the International Commission on Large Dams, a dam is ‘large’ if it 
is more than 15 metres in height or, if 5 to 15 metres high, has a storage capacity 
of more than 3 million cubic metres (WCD, 2000). 
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Classical development measures development in terms of gross domestic 
product (GDP) per capita. The focus is on increasing aggregate economic output, 
with little concern for the distribution of the benefits of economic growth. 
Modernization, according to the classical development paradigm, is central to 
increasing economic output. The application of modern scientific and technical 
knowledge to large-scale development projects is therefore a preferred means of 
pursuing development. This approach to development often manifests itself in 
massive infrastructure projects, such as large dams. 
The shift away from large dams over the previous two decades has 
coincided with a general broadening of the concept of development. Critiques of 
classical development recognized that narrowly focusing on increasing GDP did 
not deliver equitable development—that is, it did not improve the quality of life 
across society. Consequently, the notion of development has been expanded to 
include “social, cultural, political and environmental concerns and conditions.” 
(McGregor, 2008, p. 12) 
Post-development critiques of classical development—and, indeed, 
development in general—were perhaps the most scathing, arguing that 
development projects ultimately do more harm than good (McGregor, 2008; 
Potter, Conway, Evans, & Lloyd-Evans, 2012). While this article does not 
contend that this is the case for all development projects, it does contend that it 
is generally the case for large dam development projects. Post-development 
provides a useful lens through which to critique some of the fundamental biases 
that exist within the classical development paradigm as it applies to large dams. 
These include viewing nature as a collection of underutilized natural resources, 
being blind to the distributional impacts of development projects, and deferring 
political decisions to the ostensibly objective realms of science and economics. 
 
3. Nature Becomes Natural Resources 
 
Classical development views nature as a collection of natural resources. In 
this light, nature, as natural resources, is viewed as an input to production and is 
valued accordingly (Shiva, 2010). Hence, undeveloped natural spaces are seen as 
unproductive—as missed opportunities for economic growth. The dominance of 
this perspective arises in the context of many of the world’s rivers. Rivers are 
often described as water resources and ascribed a particular quantum of 
hydropower potential (Bakker, 1999). Thus, the lower Mekong River Basin is 
framed as a water resource of nearly 30,000 megawatts of unexploited 
hydropower potential (MRC, 2010). When a river system is reduced to an 
unrealized source of energy and of inputs to production, refusing to develop and 
realize that potential becomes illogical. 
Rivers are not, however, simply unrealized sources of “free energy” 
(Hirsch & Wilson, 2011 p. 1644). From an eco-centric perspective, rivers, and 
nature more generally, have intrinsic value that is independent of human use 
(McGregor, 2008). From an anthropocentric perspective, rivers have enormous 
value to those who depend on them for their livelihoods. This is well illustrated 
by the lower Mekong River Basin, where the dietary and economic security of the 
vast majority of the lower basin’s 60 million people depends on the natural 
environment supported by the Mekong River (Pearse-Smith, 2012a). Eighty-three 
percent of the economically active population in the Lower Mekong Basin is 




2010). Such reliance on nature is common to large numbers of people 
throughout the global South. 
Yet, the economic analyses underlying large dam projects frequently 
ignore the value of nature to local people. In particular, difficulties in measuring 
the informal economy mean that such analyses often do not account for the 
value nature provides to small-scale economic activities that exist outside of the 
formal economy. This reinforces the perception that natural resources are 
underutilized. In monetary terms, the economic value currently provided by the 
Mekong’s natural resources is estimated at up to US$3 billion annually (Keskinen 
et al., 2008), with its fisheries alone valued at more than US$2 billion (Middleton, 
Garcia, & Foran, 2009).2 Yet this value goes largely unrecognized in hydropower 
development plans, which means that the Mekong is viewed by policymakers as 
underutilized and ripe for large-scale development projects (Keskinen et al., 2008; 
Sarkkula et al., 2009). 
 
4. Inequitable Development 
 
Classical development is blind to the distributional impacts of 
development projects and is resultantly inequitable. The benefits are largely 
concentrated in the hands of the wealthy, while conditions for the poor either 
worsen or do not improve. Classical development therefore exacerbates existing 
inequalities instead of providing any benefit to those who need it most. The 
focus of classical development is on growing GDP, with the distribution of 
benefits generally left to the ineffective economic theory of the trickle-down of 
wealth (Chang, 2010; Quiggin, 2012). 
As was outlined above, large numbers of people in the global South rely 
on the natural environment for their livelihoods. Constructing large dams almost 
invariably involves appropriating natural spaces from “communities whose 
livelihoods they have supported for centuries.” (Shiva, 2010, p. 237) As seen in 
the Mekong, resettlement separates people from their livelihoods, forcing them 
to find alternative income sources such as low-wage laboring (Jenkins, 
McGauhey & Mills, 2008). It is not just those who are displaced by dam sites and 
reservoirs who are affected. Those living downstream from large dams have 
faced unpredictable flooding, causing a reduction in water quality and damage to 
life and property (Wyatt & Baird, 2007). Those living upstream from large dams 
have faced significantly reduced fish catches (WCD, 2000b).  
While bearing such significant costs, those who are worst affected receive 
very little benefit from large dams. The electricity produced by hydropower dams 
is largely consumed by industry and urbanites. The revenues from the sale of 
electricity generally flow to developers and the state. Often, those most 
immediately impacted by large dams do not even have access to electricity despite 
living closest to its source.  This has been the case in the Mekong Basin, where, 
despite considerable hydropower development, rural electrification rates remain 
low (ADB 2008; ICEM 2010). The extent of the spatial separation between those 
who reap the benefits and those who face the immediate impacts of large dams is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Such valuations do not even account for the cultural, aesthetic and wider-
ecosystem values of the natural environment, which cannot properly be ascribed 
a monetary value. For more on the difficulties and dangers of attempting to 
quantify the value of nature, see Bertram & Terry (2013) and Wilson (2013). 
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well illustrated by the large dams of Laos. From these dams, the vast majority of 
the electricity generated is exported to Thailand, while the social and 
environmental costs remain in rural Laos (Mitchell, 1998; Middleton, Garcia, & 
Foran, 2009). 
The benefits that large dams do provide are frequently overstated. As 
Goldmsith and Hildyard (1984) warned, “those who stand to gain politically and 
financially from the building of a large dam are willing to go to inordinate lengths 
to ensure that it will be built.” For example, many of the large dam projects in the 
Mekong Basin have been predicated on habitually overestimated energy demand 
growth forecasts (Greacen & Palettu, 2007). As observed by Sachs (2010, p. 32), 
the pursuit of classical development has led “many Third World governments 
[to] sacrifice the vital interests of half of their populations.” Again, this is the case 
for the Mekong. National and international interests are privileged over the 
interests of the local people who bear the costs of large dams (Pearse-Smith 
2012b). However, “local” people actually constitute the majority of the Mekong 
Basin’s population (Mitchell, 1988). 
 
5. De-Politicization and Disempowerment 
 
Classical development de-politicizes development decisions and 
disempowers its supposed beneficiaries. 
Once nature is viewed as a pool of natural resources, it lends itself to 
scientific management and technological development (Shiva, 2010). When a 
free-flowing river is reduced to an unrealized source of energy and irrigation, it 
makes sense to develop that potential through the construction of large dams. In 
presenting the decision to construct large dams as a rational scientific and 
economic decision, policy-makers essentially masquerade a political decision as an 
apolitical one. The knowledge offered by science and economics is presented as 
rational and indisputable, and therefore outside the realm of politics (Chang, 
2002; Alvares, 2010). The resulting “‘fact’-driven debates … ‘free’ policy-makers 
from the inherently political nature of the decisions.” (Käkönen and Hirsch, 
2009, p. 349) This process of de-politicization makes it difficult for those 
opposing dams to legitimately challenge their construction. 
Once de-politicized, a dam project can be challenged only by contesting 
the scientific and economic analyses that underpin the project. Dam opponents 
are forced to contest whether the predetermined objectives of the project will be 
achieved rather than the objectives themselves and the process by which they 
were set. In a politicized environment, those being developed would have the 
opportunity to help formulate their own development goals and needs. In a de-
politicized environment, on the other hand, the goal—national economic 
development—is already set and the process is also set. It is up to the engineers, 
economists, funders, developers and the state to decide the “right” way to 
achieve their goal. The exclusion of local people from development planning, 
even from decisions that affect them directly, pervades the Mekong Basin 
(Lauridsen 2004). 
Challenging the economic and scientific analyses of a large dam project is 
very difficult for local people to achieve given their limited resources vis-à-vis the 
state and project developers. Where affected local people do attempt to challenge 
the science and economics of a project, they face the rejection of their alternative 




Vietnam, where affected locals, with the help of NGOs, collected data and 
presented to the state their own research on the effects of the dam. Their 
findings were rejected by the state as unverifiable and unscientific. The state 
preferred its own environmental impact assessment, despite the fact that it has 
been widely critiqued as “shoddy” (Hirsch & Wyatt 2004, 65). Not only should 
local knowledge be considered just as legitimate as the state’s “scientific” 
knowledge, but in many cases local people may also be more reliable experts 
about their environment than outside consultants (Käkönen & Hirsch, 2009). 
De-legitimizing local knowledge amounts to a monopolization of knowledge 
production by the state, based on the state’s science and the state’s economics.  
 
6. Conclusion: Back to the Future 
 
Large dams and the development paradigm they reflect are out of date. 
The quintessential classical development project, dams focus narrowly on 
economic development through modernization. They undervalue nature, viewing 
it as a collection of unexploited natural resources and inputs to production. They 
deliver inequitable development, sharpening inequities by delivering benefits to 
the wealthy while the local poor bear the costs. They disempower local people by 
de-politicizing development and removing the opportunity for those being 
developed to provide input and direction to that development. Each of these 
traits of large dams has been witnessed in the Mekong River Basin. 
We should be concerned, therefore, that large dams appear to be making 
their way back to the development agenda. The Brazilian government’s 
hydropower development agenda is particularly concerning given its rapid pace 
and scale. Brazil’s energy-expansion plan includes the construction of 48 large 
dams between 2011 and 2020 (Fearnside, 2012). This includes the Monte Belo 
dam project, which is the largest dam project under consideration anywhere in 
the world (International Rivers, 2012). Construction of the first of the 
mainstream dams on the lower Mekong River has commenced, with the potential 
to open the way for another ten mainstream dams that were planned last century. 
Perhaps most concerning of all, the World Bank appears to be taking a step back 
toward the development of old by recommencing its support for large dams 
(Bosshard, 2013; World Bank, 2013). 
Unfortunately, once they are conceived, large dam projects never really 
disappear. Instead, they sit on developers’ shelves ready to re-emerge when the 
development climate is amenable (McCully, 2001). Let us not slip back into an 
outdated development paradigm that would allow developers to reach into their 
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